India Compliance Registry

Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act No. 22 of 2023); Presidential assent 11 August 2023; Gazette ID CG-DL-E-12082023-248045.

Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 notified 13 November 2025 as G.S.R. 843(E), Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II s.3(i).

Note: Gazette date corroborated across multiple law-firm analyses; the PIB document filename carries the press-release date (17 Nov), not the notification date.

Provisions constituting and empowering the Data Protection Board (ss.18–26), definitions, and procedural rules took effect on 13 November 2025.

Section 6(9) (verifiable parental consent) and section 27(1)(d) (publication duty) commence one year from notification — November 2026.

Notice and consent standards, data fiduciary duties, children's data and data principal rights commence eighteen months from notification — May 2027. Published analyses split on 12 vs 13 May; confirm the exact day with counsel before relying on it.

The Schedule to the Act caps monetary penalties at up to ₹250 crore per instance for the highest tier (failure to take reasonable security safeguards to prevent a personal data breach), with lower tiers at ₹200 crore, ₹150 crore and below; the Data Protection Board determines penalties on the facts.

Note: Amount verified directly against the Gazette PDF text ('may extend to two hundred and fifty crore rupees'). Enforcement follows the phased commencement (see dpdp-phase-3).

Under Rule 7 of the DPDP Rules 2025, a data fiduciary must intimate the Data Protection Board of a personal data breach without delay on becoming aware, follow with a detailed report within 72 hours (extendable by the Board), and notify affected data principals of the breach in plain language.

Note: Timelines corroborated across multiple legal publishers. Enforcement follows the phased commencement (see dpdp-phase-3). Runs in parallel with CERT-In’s 6-hour incident reporting — the same incident triggers both.

Every consent request must be accompanied or preceded by a notice informing the data principal of: (i) the personal data and the purpose of processing; (ii) the manner of exercising rights under s.6(4) (withdrawal) and s.13 (grievance redressal); and (iii) the manner of making a complaint to the Data Protection Board. For consents given before commencement, notice must follow as soon as reasonably practicable.

Note: Contents verified directly against the Gazette PDF text. Notice must be available in English or any Eighth Schedule language.

Directions under Section 70B(6), IT Act 2000 issued 28 April 2022; effective 28 June 2022. Apply to service providers, intermediaries, data centres, body corporates and government organisations.

Specified cyber incidents must be reported to CERT-In within 6 hours of noticing.

ICT system logs must be maintained for a rolling 180 days, within Indian jurisdiction.

System clocks must be synchronised to NIC or NPL time sources.

Data centres, VPS, cloud and VPN providers must register and retain accurate subscriber/customer records for 5 years after cancellation or withdrawal of service.

Authentication User Agencies and eKYC User Agencies must have operations audited annually (and on need) by a certified information systems auditor; the report is shared with UIDAI on request. The governing instruments are the Aadhaar (Authentication and Offline Verification) Regulations, 2021, together with the Aadhaar (Data Security) Regulations, 2016 and the UIDAI Information Security Policy.

Note: Aadhaar (Authentication and Offline Verification) Amendment Regulations were made in 2025, with further UIDAI updates in January 2026 (including a revised pre-onboarding AUA/KUA checklist). uidai.gov.in 307-redirects deep links to a single-page app, so the amendment text could not be retrieved automatically and its effect on the audit obligation is UNVERIFIED here - check the current regulation before relying on this entry for scoping.

Insurance Self-Network Platforms operate under IRDAI permission per the Guidelines on Insurance e-commerce (circular IRDA/INT/GDL/ECM/055/03/2017, 9 March 2017). The controls, systems, procedures and safeguards of the platform must be reviewed at least once a year, at the applicant's own cost, by an external Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA), a Chartered Accountant holding DISA (ICAI), or a CERT-In empanelled expert, and the resulting report placed before the Board or its sub-committee.

Note: The governing instrument is the Guidelines on Insurance e-commerce, IRDA/INT/GDL/ECM/055/03/2017 of 9 March 2017. That guidelines PDF is not retrievable in text form from the IRDAI portal, so the citation points to IRDAI's own follow-on circular, which states the reference number and date verbatim. The audit-clause wording is corroborated across multiple independent summaries; verify against the guidelines PDF before quoting it in a deliverable.

IRDAI released Version 2.0 of its Information and Cybersecurity Guidelines in April 2026, replacing the Information and Cyber Security Guidelines, 2023 dated 24 April 2023. They apply to insurers including foreign reinsurance branches, insurance intermediaries (brokers, corporate agents, web aggregators, TPAs), insurance repositories and the Insurance Information Bureau of India, and regulated entities are required to comply from the current financial year.

Note: Document confirmed present on IRDAI's own portal under this title. IRDAI publishes the PDF as a scanned image with no text layer, so the circular reference (IRDAI/GA&HR/CIR/MISC/51/4/2026) and the 6 April 2026 issue date are corroborated across independent professional-services analyses rather than read from the primary file. Confirm the reference against the PDF before citing it in a report.

IRDAI issued the Information and Cyber Security Guidelines, 2023 on 24 April 2023 (ref IRDAI/GA&HR/GDL/MISC/88/04/2023), superseding the 2017 guidelines (IRDA/IT/GDL/MISC/082/04/2017) and three subsequent circulars. These were themselves superseded on 6 April 2026 by the IRDAI Information and Cybersecurity Guidelines, 2026 (Version 2.0) - the 2023 text is retained here as the previous baseline, not as the current requirement.

PCI DSS v4.0.1 is the current standard published by the PCI Security Standards Council.

PCI DSS v3.2.1 retired 31 March 2024. v4.0.1 (a limited revision — no requirements added or removed) was published 11 June 2024, and v4.0 retired 31 December 2024, leaving v4.0.1 the only active version. The 51 future-dated v4.x requirements became mandatory in assessments from 31 March 2025.

PCI SSC publishes ten SAQs: A, A-EP, B, B-IP, C, C-VT, D for Merchants, D for Service Providers, P2PE and SPoC. A separate “SAQ Instructions and Guidelines” document accompanies them and sets out eligibility for each.

Note: Enumerated from PCI SSC’s document library. Which SAQ a given entity may use depends on how it handles cardholder data, and validation is ultimately driven by the acquirer or card brand rather than by PCI SSC. The eligibility criteria sit inside the SAQ Instructions document, which is distributed under licence acceptance and cannot be retrieved automatically — so this entry records the set of questionnaires, not the criteria.

“Integrating Artificial Intelligence in PCI Assessments Guidelines v1.0” is published in the PCI SSC document library, establishing that the Council addresses the use of AI within PCI assessments at version 1.0.

Note: This entry records the document’s existence and version, both visible in the document library. Its contents are behind licence acceptance and have not been read, so no substantive requirement is asserted here.

PCI DSS v4.x allows two approaches. The Defined Approach is the traditional method: the entity implements the stated requirement and the assessor follows the defined testing procedures. The Customized Approach, new in v4.x, lets an entity meet a requirement’s Customized Approach Objective by other means, supporting innovation in security practice. Compensating controls are available only under the defined approach, and only where a legitimate, documented technical or business constraint prevents meeting the requirement as stated; they must be documented annually, reviewed and validated by the assessor, and submitted with the ROC.

Note: Section 1.2. The document states plainly: “Compensating Controls are not an option for the Customized Approach.” Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

Each individual PCI DSS requirement is reported as exactly one of: In Place, Not Applicable, Not Tested, or Not in Place. Not Applicable requires the assessor to render an opinion and to report the testing performed to confirm non-applicability. Not Tested means the requirement was excluded from consideration entirely — the assessor follows the entity’s instruction and renders no opinion — and any use of Not Tested makes the engagement a Partial Assessment.

Note: Sections 2.2, 2.3, 4.1 and 4.2. “In Place with Remediation” existed in the original v4.0 ROC Template and was removed by Revision 1, so it is not a valid finding. Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

The ROC records an Overall Assessment Result of Compliant, Compliant but with Legal Exception, or Non-Compliant. Separately it records whether a Full or Partial Assessment was performed: Full means every requirement was assessed and none marked Not Tested; Partial means one or more were marked Not Tested. “Compliant but with Legal Exception” applies where a statutory law or regulation prohibits meeting a requirement — the assessor must confirm such a law exists, and contractual obligations or legal advice do not qualify.

Note: Sections 2.1, 2.3 and 4.1. Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

The PCI DSS ROC Template is mandatory for QSAs reporting a PCI DSS assessment, and every response section must be completed even where requirements are not applicable. QSAs may add company logos and legal wording to the customisable title page, change page headers, add table rows, and delete the ROC Template Instructions before issuing the report. They may not edit footers, change the format, reorder or remove sections or requirements, or remove any content from Parts I and II.

Note: Sections 5.1 and 5.4. The current unlocked Word version is distributed to assessors through the Assessor Portal at programs.pcissc.org. Accepting payment brands or acquirers may reject a report whose template changes they consider unacceptable. Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

PCI DSS v4.0 introduced the targeted risk analysis (TRA). Requirement 12.3.1 covers TRAs that set how frequently a periodic activity is performed; Requirement 12.3.2 covers TRAs supporting any requirement met by the customized approach. A TRA is required only where a requirement explicitly says so. Once prepared, the entity reviews each TRA at least once every 12 months and on changes that could affect risk. A TRA cannot be used to perform an activity LESS often than a requirement states — that is a failure of the requirement, not a risk decision.

Note: Introduction and FAQs 1, 2, 5 and 6. Performing an activity MORE often than stated needs no TRA. Where a documented technical or business constraint prevents meeting a stated frequency, the route is a compensating control, not a TRA. Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

Nine requirements let the entity set frequency by TRA, and PCI SSC publishes baseline recommendations for each: malware-risk re-evaluation for components deemed not at risk (5.2.3.1) at least every six months; periodic malware scans (5.3.2.1) daily; review of application and system account access (7.2.5.1) every six months; changing application and system account passwords (8.6.3) every three months; POI device inspections (9.5.1.2.1) monthly; log reviews for other system components (10.4.2.1) every seven days; remediation of non-critical vulnerabilities (11.3.1.1) within three months for medium and six months for low; payment-page change- and tamper-detection (11.6.1) every seven days; and incident-response training (12.10.4.1) yearly and at the start of employment.

Note: Table at the end of the supplement. These are recommendations, not requirements — a TRA is still required to document and justify whichever frequency the entity selects. Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

Appendix A3, Designated Entities Supplemental Validation (DESV), is assessed only when an acquirer or payment brand instructs an entity to undergo it. It adds five requirement groups: A3.1 a PCI DSS compliance programme, A3.2 documented and validated scope, A3.3 PCI DSS embedded in business-as-usual, A3.4 controlled logical access, and A3.5 identification of and response to suspicious events. Its cadences are tighter than the annual assessment: scope confirmed and data discovery performed at least every three months, BAU reviews every three months, segmentation penetration testing every six months, and user-account review every six months.

Note: Instructions for Submission and Findings sections. Every DESV requirement examined states “This requirement is not eligible for the customized approach,” so DESV must be met as defined, with compensating controls the only flexibility. Read directly from the PCI SSC document named above. PCI SSC distributes its documents under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library rather than a direct file URL.

PCI SSC recommends retaining all collected assessment evidence for a minimum of three years, so an organisation can substantiate historic compliance statements and support forensic analysis after a breach. Contractual obligations or local law may require longer. Evidence includes work papers, audit results, interview notes, screenshots and configuration settings, and the retention process should guard against evidence being altered, tampered with or destroyed.

Note: Section 3.6.7. This supplement is written against PCI DSS v3.2.1 and states so; the retention recommendation is guidance rather than a numbered v4.x requirement. Where an entity forbids its QSA from retaining evidence, PCI SSC expects a formal agreement allocating retention responsibility.

SAQ A covers e-commerce or mail/telephone-order merchants who outsource all processing of account data to PCI DSS compliant third parties, store, process and transmit no account data electronically on their own systems or premises, have confirmed those third parties are compliant for the services used, and retain any account data only on paper not received electronically. E-commerce merchants must additionally confirm that every element of the payment page delivered to the customer’s browser originates only and directly from a compliant third-party processor, and that their site is not susceptible to script-based attacks affecting their e-commerce systems. SAQ A does not apply to face-to-face channels or to service providers.

Note: The two e-commerce criteria were ADDED by revision r1 in April 2025 — the document’s revision history records them as new eligibility criteria, not a clarification. A merchant that qualified for SAQ A before April 2025 may no longer qualify. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

SAQ A-EP covers e-commerce merchants whose website does not itself receive account data but does affect the security of the transaction or the integrity of the page accepting the customer’s account data — typically by controlling how customers or their data are redirected to a compliant processor. Each element of the payment page must originate from either the merchant’s website or a compliant third party. Where the site is hosted by a third party, that provider must meet all applicable requirements including PCI DSS Appendix A for multi-tenant hosting. The SAQ applies only to e-commerce and not to service providers.

Note: For SAQ A-EP the requirements that refer to the cardholder data environment apply to the merchant website itself, because the site directly affects how account data is transmitted even though it never receives that data. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

SAQ B covers merchants processing account data only through imprint machines or standalone dial-out terminals connected by phone line, not connected to the Internet or to other systems. SAQ B-IP covers merchants using only standalone, PCI-listed approved PTS point-of-interaction devices connected by IP directly to the payment processor, isolated from other systems, where the device does not rely on any other computer, phone or tablet to reach the processor. Neither SAQ permits electronic storage of account data, applies to e-commerce, or applies to service providers.

Note: Secure Card Readers (SCR) and Secure Card Readers for PIN (SCRP) are explicitly excluded from SAQ B-IP — merchants using them are not eligible. A merchant on an expired PTS POI device should check acceptability with its acquirer or the payment brands. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

SAQ C covers merchants with a payment application system such as a POS on the same device or LAN as an Internet connection, isolated from all other systems, where the POS location is not connected to other premises and any LAN serves a single store only. SAQ C-VT covers merchants whose only processing is manual, single-transaction keyboard entry into a third-party hosted virtual payment terminal, accessed from an isolated computing device in a single location with no card readers attached and no software that stores account data. Neither stores account data electronically, applies to e-commerce, or applies to service providers.

Note: Isolation in both SAQs may be achieved by network segmentation, and does not prevent the permitted system type from transmitting transaction data onward to an acquirer or processor. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

SAQ P2PE covers merchants whose payment processing runs entirely through payment terminals belonging to a validated, PCI-listed point-to-point encryption solution, where those terminals are the only systems that store, process or transmit account data, the merchant has no access to clear-text account data on any computer system, and the merchant has implemented all controls in the P2PE Instruction Manual supplied by the solution provider. It does not apply to e-commerce or to service providers.

Note: Solutions appearing on the PCI list of Point-to-Point Solutions with Expired Validations are no longer “validated”; a merchant on an expired solution should confirm acceptability with its acquirer or the payment brands. A mail/telephone-order merchant keying data from paper or a call directly into such a terminal can qualify. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

SAQ SPoC covers merchants processing card-present transactions only through a PCI-listed approved PTS Secure Card Reader-PIN device together with a commercial off-the-shelf mobile device, as part of a validated PCI-listed Software-based PIN Entry on COTS solution, with no access to clear-text account data on any computer system. The COTS device is general purpose — it need not be dedicated to payments.

Note: Merchants using non-PTS-listed magnetic stripe readers are not eligible. The SAQ may be used for PTS-listed SCRPs that include magnetic stripe reader functionality. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

SAQ D for Merchants applies to any SAQ-eligible merchant that does not meet the criteria for another SAQ type — including e-commerce merchants who accept account data on their own website, merchants who store account data electronically, and merchants who would otherwise fit a narrower SAQ but have additional PCI DSS requirements applicable to their environment. SAQ D for Service Providers applies to all service providers a payment brand has deemed eligible to self-assess.

Note: Under PCI DSS v4.x, SAQ D for Service Providers requires additional documentation in Section 2a and requires the service provider to describe results for each requirement rather than simply answer. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

Each SAQ states that the merchant confirms eligibility “for this payment channel”, so a merchant running several channels may need to validate them separately. Of the nine merchant SAQs, only SAQ A and SAQ A-EP cover e-commerce; B, B-IP, C, C-VT, P2PE and SPoC each state they are not applicable to e-commerce channels. Every SAQ except SAQ D for Service Providers states it is not applicable to service providers. In all cases the entity must also meet whatever validation its acquirer or the payment brands require — PCI SSC does not set that.

Note: This channel-by-channel framing is the most commonly missed point in scoping conversations: qualifying for a narrow SAQ on one channel says nothing about the others. Read directly from the document named above. PCI SSC distributes it under a licence acceptance that blocks automated retrieval, so the citation points at the document library.

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard v5.0.0 (May 2025): ~350 requirements across 17 chapters, three verification levels (L1–L3).

Version 5.0.0 of the Application Security Verification Standard sets out 345 verification requirements organised into 17 chapters, covering encoding and sanitization, validation, web frontend security, API and web service, file handling, authentication, session management, authorization, self-contained tokens, OAuth and OIDC, cryptography, secure communication, configuration, data protection, secure coding and architecture, security logging and error handling, and WebRTC.

Note: Counted from the machine-readable ASVS 5.0.0 requirement set published in the OWASP/ASVS repository. No release date is recorded here because that file carries none.

ASVS 5.0.0 assigns each requirement to one of three levels. Level 1 carries 70 requirements, Level 2 carries 183, and Level 3 carries 92, totalling 345. The levels are cumulative in practice: an application verified at a higher level is expected to satisfy the lower levels too, so Level 3 verification covers the full set.

Note: Level counts computed from the ASVS 5.0.0 requirement set. Treat the split as the shape of the standard rather than an estimate of effort — Level 1 is deliberately the smallest tier.

SEBI issued the Cybersecurity and Cyber Resilience Framework vide circular SEBI/HO/ITD-1/ITD_CSC_EXT/P/CIR/2024/113 dated 20 August 2024 (Version 1.0, 205 pages). The compliance timeline was extended twice: circular 2025/45 of 28 March 2025 moved it by three months to 30 June 2025, and circular 2025/96 of 30 June 2025 moved it by a further two months to 31 August 2025. Both extensions applied to all regulated entities except Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs), KYC Registration Agencies (KRAs) and Qualified Registrars to an Issue and Share Transfer Agents (QRTAs), which stayed on the original timeline. That final date has passed, so CSCRF is fully in force.

Note: Upgraded to a primary source: this entry previously rested on the June 2025 FAQ plus independent legal analyses. The extension chain has now been read directly from the SEBI circulars themselves. The most recent CSCRF amendment is circular 2025/119 of 28 August 2025; no later CSCRF circular has issued as at 2026-08-04.

CSCRF applies proportionately by category: (i) Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs), (ii) Qualified REs, (iii) Mid-size REs, (iv) Small-size REs and (v) Self-certification REs. Entity-wise thresholds that determine which category an RE falls into are set out in the framework's “Thresholds for REs’ categorization” section.

Note: Portfolio Managers and Merchant Bankers were re-categorised by circular 2025/119 of 28 August 2025 (Part C).

The framework states: “Unless otherwise specified, all audits mentioned in CSCRF have to be conducted by CERT-In empanelled IS auditing organization.” The same requirement is restated for the VAPT and cyber audit that the Market SOC is to provide to small- and mid-size REs at affordable cost.

Note: Quoted verbatim from footnote 16, page 48 of 205.

REs identified as “Protected systems” and/or Critical Information Infrastructure by NCIIPC must complete at least two VAPT activities each year — one in each half of the financial year (April to September, October to March), each including report submission, closure and revalidation. All other REs must complete at least one, with the activity commencing in the first quarter of the financial year.

Note: Table 18, page 48. REs must plan VAPT at the start of the financial year, and no audit cycle may be left unaudited because of a change in category.

The VAPT report must be submitted within one month of completing the VAPT activity, after approval from the RE's IT Committee. Findings must be closed within three months of report submission, following a graded approach based on the criticality of the observations. Revalidation of the VAPT must be completed within five months of its completion.

Note: Table 19, page 49. Vulnerabilities still open after three months require IT Committee approval and must be closed before the next VAPT exercise begins.

CSCRF mandates a SOC for all REs except client-based stock brokers with fewer than 100 clients. An RE may use its own or group SOC, any third-party managed SOC, or the Market SOC. Small-size and Self-certification category REs are required to onboard the Market SOC, which NSE and BSE must set up and which NSDL and/or CDSL may set up optionally.

Note: Box Item 11, page 69. For small- and mid-size REs the Market SOC is also to provide VAPT and cyber audit services.

The Cyber Capability Index (CCI) applies only to MIIs and Qualified REs. MIIs must have their cyber resilience assessed against the CCI by a third party on a half-yearly basis; Qualified REs self-assess their cyber resilience using the CCI on a yearly basis.

Note: Page 14 of 205; the index itself is set out at Annexure-K, page 163.

Circular SEBI/HO/ITD-1/ITD_CSC_EXT/P/CIR/2025/119 dated 28 August 2025 issues technical clarifications in four parts: Part A, principles for REs under multiple regulators' purview, introducing a Principle of Exclusivity and a Principle of Equivalence so an RE regulated by both SEBI and (for example) RBI can demonstrate compliance without duplicating work; Part B, technical clarifications; Part C, re-categorisation of Portfolio Managers and Merchant Bankers; and Part D, Cyber Security Audit Policy Guidelines from CERT-In.

Note: This is the most recent CSCRF circular as at 2026-08-04.

RBI circular DPSS.CO.OD No.2785/06.08.005/2017-2018 (6 April 2018) requires payment system providers to store the entire data relating to their payment systems only in India, with compliance within six months (by October 2018). End-to-end transaction data is covered.

Note: Circular number cited for retrieval via RBI's notification search; we deliberately avoid deep-linking RBI's session-bound URLs.

Master Direction on Information Technology Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices (RBI/DoS/2023-24/107) issued 7 November 2023; effective 1 April 2024. Requires an IT governance framework, information/cyber security policies and periodic IT risk assurance for regulated entities.

Note: Direction number cited for retrieval via RBI notification search; RBI deep links are session-bound.

Master Direction on Outsourcing of Information Technology Services (RBI/2023-24/102) issued 10 April 2023; effective 1 October 2023. Governs material IT outsourcing by regulated entities, including vendor risk, audit rights and concentration risk.

Note: Direction number cited for retrieval via RBI notification search.

Issued 18 February 2021: minimum security standards for digital payment channels — internet banking, mobile payments and card payments — binding scheduled commercial banks, small finance banks, payments banks and card-issuing NBFCs.

Note: Direction cited by title and date for retrieval via RBI notification search.

RBI’s Cyber Security Framework in Banks (2 June 2016) requires scheduled commercial banks to report cyber incidents to RBI within 2 to 6 hours of detection, alongside board-approved cyber security policy, SOC capability and cyber crisis management plans.

The IAF three-year transition window for ISO/IEC 27001:2013 certificates ended 31 October 2025 — certificates not transitioned to the 2022 revision by that date lapsed.

Note: Deadline corroborated across accredited certification bodies (BSI, SGS, LRQA); iso.org blocks automated verification.

NIST released Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 on 26 February 2024 — the first major revision since 2014, adding the Govern function and broadening applicability beyond critical infrastructure.

CSF 2.0 organises cybersecurity outcomes under six Functions: GOVERN (GV), IDENTIFY (ID), PROTECT (PR), DETECT (DE), RESPOND (RS) and RECOVER (RC). GOVERN is new in 2.0 and covers how an organisation establishes and monitors its cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations and policy.

Note: Function identifiers counted directly in NIST CSWP 29.

Beneath the six Functions, the CSF 2.0 Core is organised into 22 Categories and 106 Subcategories. Subcategories state outcomes, not controls, and are the level at which an organisation assesses and communicates its current and target state.

Note: Counted from the unique Category and Subcategory identifiers (for example GV.OC, GV.OC-01) appearing in NIST CSWP 29 itself.

The framework defines four Tiers, quoted from the document: “Partial (Tier 1), Risk Informed (Tier 2), Repeatable (Tier 3), and Adaptive (Tier 4).” Tiers characterise the rigour of an organisation’s cybersecurity risk governance and management practices; they are not maturity levels and reaching Tier 4 is not a goal for every organisation.

Note: Tier names quoted verbatim from NIST CSWP 29.

NIST states that the CSF “offers a taxonomy of high-level cybersecurity outcomes that can be used by any organization — regardless of its size, sector, or maturity”, and that it “does not prescribe how outcomes should be achieved”, instead linking to online resources describing practices and controls. This is why the CSF is not certifiable and why an organisation cannot be audited as “CSF compliant” the way it can against ISO/IEC 27001 or PCI DSS.

Note: Quoted from the Abstract of NIST CSWP 29.

ISO/IEC 42001:2023 — the first AI management system (AIMS) standard — was published in December 2023 by ISO/IEC.

Note: iso.org blocks automated verification; publication corroborated across accredited bodies and major assurance firms.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 entered into force on 1 August 2024. Governance rules and obligations for general-purpose AI (GPAI) model providers apply from 2 August 2025 (with transition for models already on the market).

Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of 8 July 2026 (the Digital Omnibus on AI) amends Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and was published in the Official Journal on 24 July 2026, entering into force on 27 July 2026. It postpones the obligations for high-risk AI systems designated under Article 6(2) and Annex III from 2 August 2026 to 2 December 2027, and for AI embedded in products regulated under Annex I sectoral legislation to 2 August 2028. It also adds prohibitions to Article 5 covering AI that generates or manipulates realistic non-consensual intimate imagery of identifiable individuals. The Article 50 transparency duties applying from 2 August 2026 are unaffected.

Note: EUR-Lex returned an empty document to automated retrieval, so the amended dates are corroborated across multiple independent legal analyses rather than read from the primary text. The regulation number, adoption date, OJ publication date and entry into force are consistent across every source checked. Confirm article-level wording against the Official Journal before relying on this in a deliverable. The staggered application dates were subsequently amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI); GPAI obligations themselves were not postponed.

Article 113 provides that the Regulation applies from 2 August 2026, with three exceptions: Chapters I and II (general provisions and prohibited AI practices) applied from 2 February 2025; Chapter III Section 4, Chapter V, Chapter VII, Chapter XII and Article 78 (notifying authorities, general-purpose AI models, governance, penalties and confidentiality) applied from 2 August 2025, with the exception of Article 101; and Article 6(1), covering high-risk classification for AI as a safety component of products already regulated under Union law, applies from 2 August 2027.

Note: Article 113 read verbatim from the Official Journal text. The Regulation was done at Brussels on 13 June 2024 and entered into force on the twentieth day following publication. AMENDED: Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (in force 27 July 2026) postponed the Annex III high-risk obligations to 2 December 2027 and the Annex I embedded-product obligations to 2 August 2028. This entry records Article 113 as originally enacted and must not be read on its own as the current position.

Infringement of the Article 5 prohibited-practices rules is subject to administrative fines of up to EUR 35 000 000 or 7 % of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. Breach of most other operator obligations attracts up to EUR 15 000 000 or 3 %. Supplying incorrect, incomplete or misleading information to notified bodies or national authorities attracts up to EUR 7 500 000 or 1 %. For SMEs including start-ups, each ceiling is the lower rather than the higher of the two figures.

Note: Article 99. Penalties applied from 2 August 2025 under Article 113(b); Member States set the detailed rules and notify the Commission.

Article 111 gives longer runways to AI already in service. Providers of general-purpose AI models placed on the market before 2 August 2025 must comply by 2 August 2027. High-risk systems placed on the market before 2 August 2026 are caught only if subject to significant design changes after that date — but providers and deployers of high-risk systems intended for use by public authorities must comply by 2 August 2030 regardless. AI systems that are components of the large-scale IT systems listed in Annex X and placed on the market before 2 August 2027 must be brought into compliance by 31 December 2030.

Note: Article 111 read verbatim. These transitions are the reason an organisation can be lawfully operating non-conforming AI today and still face a hard compliance date. AMENDED: the 2 August 2026 pivot date for high-risk systems was moved by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744; read alongside the Digital Omnibus entry before applying these transitions to a client estate.

The Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) issued its Cyber Security Framework v1.0 in May 2017. It applies to all SAMA-regulated Member Organizations — banks, insurance and reinsurance companies, financing companies, credit bureaus and the Financial Market Infrastructure — and is principle-based, drawing on NIST, ISF, ISO, Basel and PCI. Member Organizations are expected to operate at maturity level 3 or higher.

Saudi Arabia's National Cybersecurity Authority first issued the Essential Cybersecurity Controls as ECC-1:2018. ECC-2:2024 consists of 4 cybersecurity main domains (Cybersecurity Governance, Cybersecurity Defense, Cybersecurity Resilience, and Third-Party & Cloud Computing Cybersecurity), 28 subdomains, 108 main controls and 92 subcontrols. The Controls apply to government agencies in the Kingdom (including ministries, authorities and establishments) and their affiliated companies and entities inside and outside the Kingdom, and to all private-sector entities owning, operating or hosting Critical National Infrastructure; each entity must comply with all controls applicable to it.

Note: Counts and scope read directly from the ECC – 2 : 2024 document. NCA's canonical index sits at nca.gov.sa/en/regulatory-documents/controls-list/ecc/, which is unreachable from outside the region; this CDN copy is NCA's own published file and does resolve. Compliance is mandated by Article 10(3) of the NCA Statute and High Order No. 57231 dated 10/11/1439H.

The CMMC Program rule (32 CFR Part 170) was published 15 October 2024 and took effect 16 December 2024. The acquisition rule (48 CFR) took effect 10 November 2025, starting a phased rollout that adds CMMC requirements to DoD contracts in four annual phases.

Note: 48 CFR effective date corroborated across defence-contracting counsel and assessor publications.

UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data was issued in 2021 and came into effect on 2 January 2022. The DIFC and ADGM financial free zones run their own data-protection regimes in place of the federal law.

Note: OPEN QUESTION - do not treat as settled. Multiple secondary sources report that the Executive Regulations to Federal Decree-Law 45/2021 have been issued, which would activate full enforcement, but they conflict on the instrument and date (one cites Cabinet Decision No. 33 of 2024, others simply say 2026) and none cite a Cabinet Decision number against a primary UAE government source. Not recorded as fact until confirmed from the official gazette or the UAE Data Office.

SWIFT launched the Customer Security Programme in 2016. Connected organisations attest annually against the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF, revised yearly), and from 2021 an independent assessment became mandatory for attestations rather than pure self-attestation.

The framework sets out 32 security controls, of which 26 are mandatory and 6 advisory, resting on three overarching objectives supported by seven security principles. Mandatory controls establish a security baseline for the entire Swift user community; advisory controls are optional best practices Swift recommends. The six advisory controls are 2.5A External Transmission Data Protection, 2.11A RMA Business Controls, 5.3A Staff Screening Process, 6.5A Intrusion Detection, 7.3A Penetration Testing and 7.4A Scenario-based Risk Assessment.

Note: The 26/6 split is stated in the document and independently confirmed by counting control identifiers: 32 unique IDs, of which 6 carry the A suffix denoting advisory. Read directly from the document named above. The Swift CSP Document Centre sits behind myswift authentication, so the citation points at the document centre rather than a file URL.

Swift users must attest their compliance through the KYC Security Attestation (KYC-SA) application by the end of each year, against the CSCF in effect at that time. A new CSCF version is published each July and becomes the attestation basis from July of the following year. The document states the position for this cycle directly: users must attest between July 2026 and December 2026 against the controls listed in CSCF v2026, which was published in mid-2025.

Note: The v2026 attestation window is therefore open now and closes at the end of December 2026. Users control their own attestation data and may grant counterparties access to view it, which is what makes a weak attestation a commercial problem and not only a compliance one. Read directly from the document named above. The Swift CSP Document Centre sits behind myswift authentication, so the citation points at the document centre rather than a file URL.

Each user must identify which of five reference architecture types most closely matches its deployment, because scope and applicable controls follow from that choice. The types are A1 (user owns the communication interface, and generally the messaging interface), A2, A3, A4 and B. Component or licence ownership is the key differentiator, and where more than one could apply the most comprehensive architecture must be chosen. Swift publishes a CSP architecture decision tree to support the determination.

Note: Users owning only a communication interface and no messaging interface still fall under A1. Read directly from the document named above. The Swift CSP Document Centre sits behind myswift authentication, so the citation points at the document centre rather than a file URL.

As announced in the previous version, control 2.4 Back Office Data Flow Security is mandatory in CSCF v2026, activating the phased approach in Appendix H. At minimum a user must now protect the bridging servers guarding flows between its secure zone and the back-office first hops where the exchange is not end-to-end protected, the flows between bridging servers and between bridging servers and the secure zone in the same circumstances, and the new direct flows between the secure zone and the back-office first hop.

Note: Security of the legacy direct exchanges — between back-office first hops and bridging servers, or between first hops and the secure zone — remains advisory, with 2028 given as the tentative date for making those flows mandatory and completing control 2.4’s journey. Read directly from the document named above. The Swift CSP Document Centre sits behind myswift authentication, so the citation points at the document centre rather than a file URL.

CSCF v2025 introduced the customer client connector — an endpoint consuming APIs, a middleware or a file transfer client — as an advisory in-scope component. In v2026 it becomes a mandatory in-scope component of fourteen basic cyber-hygiene controls: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 2.7, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.4, 6.1 and 6.4. All user endpoints that connect to Swift indirectly through a service provider sharing resources are progressively treated as customer connectors, whether server or client.

Note: The document states the consequence plainly: this change “requires some users who previously attested as Architecture type B, to attest as A4 when using a customer client connector.” Architecture B is the narrowest scope and A4 is materially wider, so affected users face a larger assessment this cycle. Read directly from the document named above. The Swift CSP Document Centre sits behind myswift authentication, so the citation points at the document centre rather than a file URL.

Control 2.3 System Hardening now names Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell as native OS features to consider when shielding a Windows system. Control 2.9 Transaction Business Controls recognises Swift Universal Confirmation as a validation or reconciliation option alongside MT 900/910 and MT 940/950. Control 4.2 requires multi-factor authentication on one authentication stage for external privileged access managing firewalls, and Alliance Left and Right Security Officer accounts are now named as privileged accounts. Control 6.1 Malware Protection advises protecting non-Windows systems inside a secure zone or hosting a customer client connector. Control 7.2 Security Training and Awareness adds deepfakes as an example of AI-based threats.

Note: Swift states that at publication there is no specific guidance on using AI-based tools to support CSP controls, and that the same care applies to any tool handling the confidentiality, integrity and availability of processed data. Alliance Access Integration Platform (IPLA) and Swift Integration Layer (SIL) are expected to reach end of life in 2026 but remain in scope until then. Read directly from the document named above. The Swift CSP Document Centre sits behind myswift authentication, so the citation points at the document centre rather than a file URL.

The Master Direction defines the Central KYC Records Registry (CKYCR) as “an entity defined under Rule 2(1) of the Rules, to receive, store, safeguard and retrieve the KYC records in digital form of a customer”. The Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (CERSAI) was authorised to act as and perform the functions of the CKYCR by Gazette Notification No. S.O. 3183(E) dated 26 November 2015.

Note: “the Rules” means the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005.

Under Rule 9(1A) of the PML Rules, regulated entities shall capture the customer’s KYC records and upload them onto the CKYCR within 10 days of commencement of an account-based relationship with the customer.

Note: The ten days run from commencement of the relationship, not from when the record is judged complete — so a submission rejected on a template error still consumes the window.

The CKYCR live run began on 15 July 2016, phased, starting with new individual accounts. Scheduled Commercial Banks were required to upload KYC data for all new individual accounts opened on or after 1 January 2017 (with an initial allowance to 1 February 2017 for accounts opened during January 2017). Regulated entities other than SCBs were required to start uploading for new individual accounts opened on or after 1 April 2017. KYC records for accounts of Legal Entities opened on or after 1 April 2021 must also be uploaded.

Note: The Legal Entity obligation is the most recently added and the one most often missing from older CKYC programmes built around individual onboarding.

Regulated entities capture KYC information for sharing with the CKYCR as per the KYC templates prepared for “Individuals” and “Legal Entities”, and those templates may be revised from time to time as released by CERSAI. Operational Guidelines for uploading KYC data are published by CERSAI.

Note: Because the templates are revised, a validation performed against an older template version is not evidence that current submissions conform.

A customer may satisfy identification by submitting the KYC Identifier together with explicit consent for the regulated entity to download records from the CKYCR, instead of resubmitting officially valid documents. CERSAI asks regulated entities to display the KYC Identifier to customers on passbooks, account statements, mobile and internet banking, insurance policies and demat statements.

Note: The consent is the control that matters: a download without recorded, retrievable customer consent is an access to third-party personal data with no lawful basis to show an examiner.

Qatar's National Cyber Security Agency mandates the National Information Assurance Policy for government entities and critical infrastructure; the current revision is v2.1 (May 2023), superseding v2.0.

Note: Version and date corroborated across Qatar-focused GRC publishers; the NCSA portal hosts the controlled document.

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 entered into force 24 May 2016 and has applied across all EU member states since 25 May 2018. Breach notification to the supervisory authority is required without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours (Art. 33).

A controller must notify a personal data breach to the supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Where notification is not made within 72 hours it must be accompanied by reasons for the delay.

Note: Article 33, with Recital 85. The 72 hours runs from awareness of the breach, not from its occurrence, and the obligation is qualified by “where feasible” — it is not an absolute deadline.

The lower tier is up to 10 000 000 EUR or, for an undertaking, up to 2 % of total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher — covering obligations of controllers and processors such as security of processing, records and breach notification. The higher tier is up to 20 000 000 EUR or 4 % of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher — covering the basic principles for processing, conditions for consent, data-subject rights, and transfers to third countries.

Note: Article 83(4) and 83(5). “Undertaking” is read in the competition-law sense, so turnover can be assessed across a corporate group rather than the single legal entity fined.

Compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule was required from 20 April 2005 for most covered entities; small health plans had until 20 April 2006.

Following discovery of a breach of unsecured protected health information, a covered entity must notify each affected individual “without unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery of a breach”, except where a law-enforcement delay under § 164.412 applies.

Note: 45 CFR § 164.404(b), quoted verbatim from the eCFR text current as of 31 July 2026. Sixty days is the outer limit, not the standard — unreasonable delay inside that window is itself a violation.

For breaches of unsecured protected health information involving 500 or more individuals, the covered entity must notify the Secretary contemporaneously with the notice to individuals, in the manner specified on the HHS website. For breaches involving fewer than 500 individuals, the entity maintains a log and reports them not later than 60 days after the end of the calendar year in which they were discovered.

Note: 45 CFR § 164.408(b) and (c). The 500-individual threshold also determines whether a breach appears on the HHS public breach portal.

The Security Rule requires administrative, physical and technical safeguards for electronic protected health information. Administrative safeguards are “administrative actions, and policies and procedures, to manage the selection, development, implementation, and maintenance of security measures”. Physical safeguards are physical measures, policies and procedures protecting information systems and related buildings and equipment. Technical safeguards are the technology and the policy and procedures for its use that protect ePHI and control access to it.

Note: 45 CFR § 164.304 definitions, quoted from the eCFR text current as of 31 July 2026.

ISO published ISO 22301:2019/Amd 1:2024 in February 2024, adding consideration of climate change to the management system requirements. ISO 22301:2019 remains the current edition - the amendment supplements it rather than replacing it, and a next edition is in development with no confirmed publication date.

Note: iso.org blocks automated verification; the amendment number, scope and date are corroborated across certification bodies and ISO's own catalogue listing.

ISO 22301:2019 (business continuity management systems) was published 30 October 2019, replacing the 2012 first edition.

Note: iso.org blocks automated verification; date corroborated across certification bodies.

NPCI's volume-cap guidelines for Third-Party Application Providers in UPI (referencing circular NPCI/UPI/OC-97/2020-21) were originally to bite from 31 December 2024. The compliance timeline for existing TPAPs exceeding the cap was extended by two years, to 31 December 2026. Separately, NPCI issued Guidelines on usage of UPI APIs (OC 215 series, May 2025) requiring PSPs and acquiring banks to monitor and control API usage, with non-compliance exposing them to API restriction, penalties or suspension of new customer onboarding.

Note: npci.org.in returns HTTP 403 to automated retrieval, so circular text could not be read directly. Circular references, the two-year extension to 31 December 2026 and the OC 215 API guidelines are corroborated across independent regulatory-tracking services. Confirm clause wording against the PDFs before relying on this in a deliverable.

NPCI's Guidelines for Third-Party Application Providers in UPI (circular OC 97, 2020) impose audit and compliance obligations on TPAPs, including audits by CERT-In empanelled auditors and UPI data storage within India; PSP banks retain audit rights over TPAP UPI infrastructure.

Note: NPCI's portal blocks automated retrieval; entry verified against the official circular listing on npci.org.in plus multiple corroborating compliance analyses. Confirm clause-level wording against the PDF directly.